

Top Secret



DIRECTORATE OF
INTELLIGENCE

Imagery Analysis Service Notes

13 March 1970


DECLASS REVIEW by NIMA/DOD

CIA internal use only



Top Secret

25X1



COPY
PAGES 8 82

25X1

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP78T04759A009700010050-6

Approved For Release 2002/06/18 : CIA-RDP78T04759A009700010050-6

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence
Imagery Analysis Service

IMAGERY ANALYSIS SERVICE NOTES NO. 5/70

CONTENTS

	<u>Page</u>
<u>USSR</u>	
Status of 402J Submarine Program at Severodvinsk	3
No Alert Indicators Found on Photography of Soviet Air Defense Airfields.	4
<u>CHINA</u>	
Small Mounded Sites Near the Peking Large Mounded Strongpoints	6



25X2



25X1

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Exempt

USSRNo Alert Indicators Found on Photography of Soviet Air Defense Airfields

An IAS study to investigate whether the alert posture of Soviet Fighter Aviation of Air Defense (IA/PVO) can be determined from satellite photography has produced negative results.

Forty-five of the 93 Soviet PVO airfields, representing all ten air defense districts, were studied under normal conditions and also under two circumstances when increased readiness would be expected. The first such circumstance was the period just prior to the Czechoslovakian crisis in the summer of 1968. The second was the period of a large-scale military exercise in the Soviet Far East in [REDACTED]



25X1D

The study revealed a wide range in the number of aircraft on strip alert at PVO airfields during normal conditions, and no consistent pattern of change in this number during the crisis and exercise periods. Aircraft were considered to be on strip alert when they were seen on the alert apron at the end of the taxiway at each PVO base.

No other indicators could be found in either the appearance of the aircraft or their surroundings by which to determine an alert posture. No significant change was observed in the number of aircraft which were canvas covered or armed with air-to-air missiles, in the level of activity visible at buildings adjacent to the alert aprons, in the amount of support equipment, or in the number of air-to-air missiles seen at the airfield storage and handling facilities.

[REDACTED] 25X1

25X1



SAME SITE COMPLETE,

FIGURE 2.

-5-

TOP SECRET

25X1

25X1

Next 2 Page(s) In Document Exempt

Top Secret



Top Secret